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logic-vulnerabilities

File descriptor abuse, race conditions, and TOCTOU vulnerabilities

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Installation

Suivez les instructions du dépôt pour votre agent. Consultez les fichiers et dépendances avant l’installation.

Voir la source ↗Guides

Instructions

Logic Vulnerabilities

Exploits targeting program logic rather than memory corruption.


1. File Descriptor (FD) Abuse

Concept: Manipulate which file a hardcoded FD refers to.

Signals:

  • Program uses constant FD (e.g., read(3, buf, n))
  • FD assignment can be influenced before target code runs

FD basics:

0 = stdin, 1 = stdout, 2 = stderr
3+ = assigned in order by open()

Approach A - Claim target FD:

1. Close lower FDs to influence assignment
2. Open desired file (gets lowest available FD)
3. dup2() to target FD number
4. Execute vulnerable program

Approach B - FD exhaustion:

1. Open many files to consume FD numbers
2. Next open() returns predictable FD

Approach C - Symlink redirection:

1. Program opens user-controlled path
2. Create symlink pointing to sensitive file

2. TOCTOU (Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use)

Concept: Change what a path refers to between validation and use.

Signals:

  • Check: stat(), access(), lstat()
  • Gap/delay
  • Use: open(), read(), exec()
  • Path-based (not FD-based) operations

The race window:

Victim:    [CHECK path] ----delay---- [USE path]
Attacker:              [SWAP target]

Approach A - Symlink race:

Thread 1: Rapidly flip symlink between allowed and sensitive targets
Thread 2: Repeatedly trigger victim until race succeeds

Approach B - Rename race:

Rapidly rename/swap files at target path

Improving success rate:

  • Multiple racing processes
  • Tune timing based on victim's check-use gap
  • Use inotify to detect access and trigger swap

Detection Patterns

FD abuse indicators:

// Hardcoded FD without validation
read(3, buf, size);

// Sequential FD assumption
int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
// Assumes fd == 3

TOCTOU indicators:

// Vulnerable: path-based check then use
if (access(path, R_OK) == 0) {
    fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);  // Race window!
}

// Safer: FD-based throughout
fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
fstat(fd, &st);  // Uses FD, not path

Debugging

# Trace FD operations
strace -e trace=open,openat,read,write,dup2 <program>

# Watch file access for timing
inotifywait -m <path> -e access

Pitfalls

Issue Cause Solution
O_NOFOLLOW Symlinks not followed Use rename instead
openat() FD-relative paths Target the directory FD
Atomic operations No race window Different approach needed
Low success rate Narrow window More processes, better timing

Exemples

Consultez les exemples du dépôt source.

Voir la source ↗

Historique source

Date d’indexation
2026-01-20
Mise à jour de l’index
2026-02-04
Branch
main

Les dates concernent ce répertoire. Consultez le dépôt pour l’historique du code.

GitHub ↗

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